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Abstract: 
In this paper, we expand upon earlier analysis of location-service related privacy policies in the 
public and private sector. Our intent is to identify key privacy components in an effort to more 
clearly and consistently address the privacy expectations of the public through the protections 
provided them by service and product providers. Through use of content analysis, we aim to 
determine how understandable current privacy policies are to the average consumer, how 
comprehensively they address identified components of privacy, and how consistently privacy is 
treated in the location arena. It is hoped that this analysis will assist with the development of 
practical and comprehensive approaches to privacy preservation in the area of Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS) and Location-based services (LBS).  
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1. Introduction 
The rapid growth in location-based and mobile technologies has led to massive increases in the 
amount of individual location information being collected. Public organizations, such as transit 
agencies and departments of transportation, may have access to detailed location data from RFID-
enabled transit cards or GPS-enabled electronic toll collection systems. Location-sensing 
smartphone-based applications, such as Foursquare, Loopt  and Twitter, have the ability to collect 
detailed information on a person’s whereabouts and combine this information with a unique device 
identifier, contact information, and even a user’s social network. According to the Wall Street 
Journal (2010), “An examination of 101 popular smartphone ‘apps’—games and other software 
applications for iPhone and Android phones—showed that 56 transmitted the phone's unique device 
ID to other companies without users' awareness or consent. Forty-seven apps transmitted the 
phone's location in some way. Five sent age, gender and other personal details to outsiders.” 
Findings such as these, combined with the increasing ubiquity of smartphones, have led to a wide 
range of discussions and debates around the notion of location and mobile privacy.   
According to Liu (2009), “From the privacy policy perspective, location privacy refers to the claim 
(right) of individuals, groups, and institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and to what 
extent location information about them can be communicated to others.” In this context, “privacy 
policies” that are available in websites or with mobile apps are defined as legal documents that 
disclose a web site or a service’s practices regarding the ways in which the site or service gathers, 
uses, discloses, and/or manages a user’s data or information generated by users. These are available 
either as stand-alone documents or within Terms of Agreements of websites and apps. 
Worldwide, new policies and procedures related to the privacy of mobile and location data are 
beginning to emerge, with the EU Data Protection Working Party adopting an Opinion on 
Geolocation services on smart mobile devices in May of 2011, and the US Congress and Senate both 
holding hearings related to location based services and privacy in 2011. In addition, Google’s recent 
privacy policy changes, including those related to location and mobile data, have seen a flurry of 
responses, including from the Office of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner (McKay, 2012), a 
collection of US Attorneys General (National Association of Attorneys General, 2012), and a 
collection of Privacy Commissioners from the Asia Pacific region (including New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, Mexico, Hong Kong and South Korea (Sydney Morning Herald, 2012)).  
These findings and activities underscore the importance of privacy policies in the landscape of 
mobile and location services, and indicate the growing recognition that effectively managing and 
communicating their related practices will be a key point of future use. From this recognition, 
however, emerge three related questions: first, how effective are current mobile and location-based 
privacy policies at communicating practices to consumers; second, how comprehensive are these 
polices; and third, is there consistency in how location and mobile data are treated across a range of 
service providers. The answers to these questions will have far-reaching ramifications for both the 
manner in which location privacy is treated from the point of view of local and national governments 
as well as for the understanding of privacy from the point of view of the consumer.  
This paper will attempt to address these questions by reviewing the privacy policies of 101 public 
and private organizations that offer location and mobility services as a part of their Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS) and Location-Based Services (LBS) programs. Based on an analysis of 
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these policies, we aim to determine, first, how understandable they are to the average user, second, 
how comprehensively they address different components of privacy, and, third, how consistently 
privacy is treated across these policies. A similar approach was taken in Cottrill and Thakuriah 
(2011); however, that evaluation was limited to an analysis of privacy policies of private companies, 
and based primarily on frequencies of words relating to locational privacy and by the presence or 
absence of elements of privacy concern such as notice, consent, redress policies and so on (as 
defined in Section 2.1 below). Here, we expand upon that research, first, to include a wider range of 
organizations in order to better understand how privacy is treated within both public and private 
contexts. Next, we use content analysis to broaden the analysis to look more deeply at clustering 
and correspondence within and between policies in order to provide more detailed information on 
how policies differ, and how included privacy elements may relate to one another. Our aim is to 
expand the growing literature on location privacy in the transportation realm by providing a more 
comprehensive approach to ascertaining how privacy is addressed by organizations and presented 
to the consumer.  
The results of this analysis will be used to identify key components in efforts to move towards more 
unified and effective location privacy policies that reflect the needs of consumers, governments, and 
service providers. Of note is that, while the analysis will focus on the privacy policies of US-based 
firms and organizations, the overall findings from the analysis are applicable across a wide range of 
services and locations, particularly as applications and services developed in one nation or state may 
easily be transported across borders. Additionally, the approach used is one that is generalizable to 
other policy evaluation activities, thus developing a prototype approach by which other analysis may 
take place.  
2. Background 
Studies of location privacy tend to be grounded in either a technological or a policy-based 
methodology. While some approaches work to balance the overlapping needs of the two, it is rare 
that consumer needs and desires are reviewed in the context of applications of technology or the 
policies that guide them. There is an extensive literature available on technological approaches to 
protection of location privacy (see, for example, Ardagna, et al., 2011; Xu, et al., 2010; Ban and 
Gruteser, 2010; Liu, 2009); however, many of these studies have been undertaken as general 
reviews of how location data may be protected in the absence of an understanding of those data 
that users of location services may find most sensitive. Policy reviews may, on the other hand, take 
place in the absence of understanding of the potential for privacy violations in terms of data 
collection and availability in the presence of location technologies. The gap between the two may be 
addressed by either evaluating the willingness of consumers to trade privacy for location services, or 
by evaluating policies in the context of the user’s expectation of privacy.    
Potoglou, et al. (2009) have provided perhaps the clearest example of how the first of such studies 
may take place, in their approach to evaluation of the willingness of persons to make trade-offs 
between privacy, liberty and security. In this study, the authors note that, “While research on the 
security of public transport systems has been extensive from a public spending and benefits 
perspective, individuals’ preferences have hardly been explored…” (Potoglou, et al., 2009) In their 
exploration of these preferences, the authors use a stated preference approach to evaluate and 
quantify the willingness of persons to trade privacy and liberty for a safer and more secure travel 
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experience on public rail in the UK. By using this approach, combined with evaluations of consumer 
trust, the authors were able to test various scenarios that provide insight on how users may value 
actions taken to protect their security within the context of their privacy preferences and beliefs, 
thus providing an examination of the “gap” between public policy and user preference.  
This gap between policy and preference highlights the importance of trust in respect to privacy 
issues, particularly as it takes place, like travel, in the public realm. Privacy policies in location 
services hinge on the relationship of public expectations, legality and trust. While it is critical from 
the point of view of service providers to ensure that their privacy policies address privacy issues as 
required by applicable laws and regulations, it is also important that they (either solely by their 
existence or by their contents) convey a sense of trust to the user, such that they will provide an 
incentive for use of the application or service.   Relationships between data producers, collectors, 
and consumers are based on a number of factors, including the degree to which data producers trust 
that the collectors and consumers will respect the contextual norms associated with these data. The 
relationship between trust and privacy has been examined by a number of researchers, including 
Karvonen (2010), Liu, et al. (2004), and Metzger (2004). Generally, it is found that the concepts of 
privacy and trust are closely linked, with trust serving as an intermediate variable in consumer 
willingness to release private information to agencies and organizations (Liu, et al. (2004)).  
In the context of ubiquitous computing (“ubicomp”) in the mobile environment, Karvonen (2010) 
states the following, “Ubiquitous systems gather information from their users and the user has to be 
able to trust the system to give out the needed information regarding him/her. Furthermore, the 
ideology of invisibility with ubicomp systems causes extra requirements for the development of user 
acceptance and trust.” Ubiquitous computing in the mobile environment, whether in the form of 
current technologies such as location-based applications and GPS-enabled mobile technologies, or of 
proposed technologies such as peer-to-peer safety information, may be largely invisible to those 
using the system, thus requiring both enhanced consumer data protection, as well as fairly 
transparent implementation.  
Recent privacy-related violations from such companies as Facebook (Helft, 2010), Apple (Zyskowski, 
2011), and Google (Halliday, 2010) have put privacy concerns at the forefront of policy and 
technology issues as they relate to location-enabled technologies. Such a trend is clearly evident in 
findings from a recent survey conducted by Harris Polls for TRUSTe (2011) which showed that, 
“Privacy concerns rank #1: Most consumers expressed great concern about their data privacy both 
when using smartphones in general, and when using mobile apps in particular...” Given that 
companies generally limit communication of their privacy preservation methods to privacy policies 
(whether stand-alone or embedded in terms of service), ensuring adequacy of these policies is 
necessary to assure the user, and protect the rights and responsibilities of both the user and the 
agency of interest. Negative publicity or general distrust in government agencies or private 
corporations may enhance privacy concerns in the absence of adequate policies, and erode the trust 
necessary to help enhance likelihood of technology adoption on the part of consumers. Carefully 
constructed, readable, and comprehensive privacy policies and statements may be useful here, as 
indicated by Hui, et al. (2006); however, there are few available metrics for evaluating how well 
current privacy policies reflect categories of interest within the domain of locational privacy. The 
next section will first identify one method of approaching these categories, followed by an initial 
description of the policies of interest. 
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The most common privacy metric currently in use is that of Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs) (Shapiro (2012); Hansen, et al. (2008); Shilton (2009)). First introduced in 1973 by the HEW 
(Health, Education, Welfare) Advisory Committee on Automated Data Systems, The Code of Fair 
Information Practices evolved over time to become the basis for FIPPs, as outlined by the US Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC, 2007), which identifies the following components as needed to provide 
adequate safeguards for privacy protection: 
• Notice/Awareness: The basis for privacy protection; notice should be given to consumers 
before any personal information is collected in order for them to have the foundation for 
making an informed choice about whether or not to share. 
• Choice/Consent: Provision of an option for consumers regarding whether or not to share 
private data and for what it may be used. 
• Access/Participation: The ability of a consumer to access data that has been collected on him 
or her and correct, amend, or have removed that data if it is incorrect.  
• Integrity/Security: The need for data collectors to ensure that their data is stored and 
managed securely, both through technological and administrative means. 
• Enforcement/Redress: Provision of a mechanism for enforcement of the above principles. 
These principles are reflected to varying degrees in the privacy policies of several umbrella 
organizations with ties to the location services and ITS industries, including ITS America, CTIA – The 
Wireless Association, and VII/IntelliDrive (Cottrill and Thakuriah, 2011); this, along with their 
standardization and comprehensiveness, has led to them being chosen as the basis upon which 
policy analysis will take place. Here, we are to some point constrained by current privacy preserving 
practices. While the FTC criteria are generally adequate for determining overall privacy dimensions, 
there may be issues that arise with the introduction of location’s spatio-temporal attributes. While 
the above categories capture the essence of needed privacy information, there may be need for 
more explicit directions to be given pertaining to how different types of data should be addressed 
for privacy protection. For purposes of this analysis, however, we will retain the FTC criteria in order 
to work within the prevailing paradigm.   
As noted in the introduction, we focus here primarily on the US case; however, it should be noted 
that the issues, concerns, and constraints we address reach far beyond the borders of the United 
States. As noted in Cottrill (2011), location data and spatial services are generally not limited by 
geographic boundaries. While distinctions can be made in concerns relevant to spatially-bounded 
services (such as electronic toll collection media) and those that function worldwide (such as 
Foursquare), the fundamental components of privacy outlined in the FTC FIPPs are generally 
applicable to privacy and data protection regulations and directives from a wide variety of countries, 
and issues in their communication are of general concern to both public and private agencies and 
organizations worldwide (Cottrill, 2011).  In this analysis, we hope to provide a review that, while 
bounded geographically in scope, may add to the wider literature on methods and 
recommendations for privacy protection applications in a spatially unbounded perspective. 
3. Data and Research Approach 
As described earlier, the primary approach to determine whether privacy policies may be 
instruments to safeguard the privacy of the user’s location information is to examine a sample of 
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existing policies. We then evaluate, using the criteria presented in the previous section and content 
analysis, the extent to which the policies address privacy concerns. In the following subsections, we 
present the data collection method used and the analysis approach.   
3.1 Sampling, Policy Selection and Data 
Due to the rapid emergence of LBS applications and services, as well as increasing adoption of ITS 
technologies by public agencies, policies selected for analysis represent a convenience sample of all 
possible policies. This is because we do not currently have a complete sampling frame from which to 
randomly select policies, as the universe of organizations which offer location-based services, and 
the myriad services which these organizations offer, is not known. While we have attempted to 
construct a sampling frame from established sources (such as Directions magazine as described 
below), we believe that these sources will under-represent smaller companies supplying mobile 
location-based services (for example, the one-person app developer or non-profit organization). We 
have stratified organizations which provide mobile location and transportation services into private 
service providers, public service providers, Electronic Toll Collection agencies and Electronic Transit 
Fare collection agencies. It should be noted that these distinctions have been made primarily for 
purposes of analysis, as consumers often do not differentiate between the type of organization 
providing a service and/or collecting data. For our purposes, however, underlying distinctions in 
legal and/or regulatory requirements for public versus private organisations indicate the need for a 
more differentiated study. Table 1 below provides a general overview of the organization types 
selected for evaluation and examples of services they provide. The organization types and the 
methods used to select them will be described in more detail below.  
Table 1: Agency Types of Policies Evaluated 
Type of Organization 
Sample 
Size Examples of Services Provided 
Private ITS or LBS Service Provider 48 
Navigation services 
Social networking 
Mobile commerce 
Entertainment and service guides 
Traffic information 
Public Service Provider 34 
Transit information and navigation 
Traffic information 
Public services 
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) 7 
Provide electronic toll collection services and 
associated devices 
Electronic Transit Fare (ETF) 12 
Provide services for electronic payment of transit 
fares 
   
Public service providers include both transit providers and public Departments of Transportation 
(DOTs) that may be affiliated with transit providers or that host the privacy policy for transit 
providers. To select privacy policies of these public agencies, the Federal Transit Administration’s 
website was first used to identify the universe of transit or transit-related agencies. These agencies 
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were then assessed to determine if (a) they provided privacy policies, and (b) if they currently use 
electronic transit (or fare) (ETF) cards. If they currently provide ETF or ETC services, they were split 
into a separate category, described below. For the remaining agencies, if a privacy policy was 
provided, it was retained for analysis.  
Privacy policies related to ETF services, though often aligned with public service providers and 
guided by overarching policies applicable to the relevant DOTs or city or state governments, were 
analysed within a separate category. This decision was made based on an initial, cursory analysis 
that revealed substantial differences in the contents of the two policy types. Such differences 
include, for example, the addition of detail related to financial considerations and associated 
extensive personally identifying information. An additional consideration was that overarching 
privacy policies for agencies that provide services such as trip-planning targeted at transit service 
users are generally accessible from a number of platforms (such as on paper, on a service website, or 
via mobile phones), while those geared for ETF (and ETC) use are generally included in terms of 
service or application agreements, which may be accessed only at the point of application. Because 
of these differences, ETF policies have been analyzed separately from overall public service policies.  
For electronic toll collection (ETC) policies, a web search was conducted to identify currently 
implemented ETC systems in the United States. Of the ETC systems identified, seven had publicly 
available privacy policies, which were gathered and pre-processed.  Additional ETC providers were 
contacted in an attempt to obtain additional privacy policies; however, no additional policies were 
received. As with ETF policies, some ETC networks are administered through public agencies; 
however, due to the differences in content in these policies when contrasted with general public 
agency policies, they were analysed in a separate category.  
A directory of LBS companies available from Directions Magazine (2010) was used to identify specific 
private mobility information companies, from which a total of 48 companies were retained. A 
majority of the companies are headquartered in the U.S, and all operate within the U.S. While the 
Directions Magazine listings may not be a fully accurate sampling frame of the universe of such 
companies operating within the U.S., it does provide a fairly comprehensive overview of companies 
of interest. As with public services, there are a large number of private ITS and LBS agency types, 
serving both individuals and manufacturers of services targeted at individuals (such as provision of 
background maps for mobile navigation systems). While the privacy policies of these agencies may 
have differing impacts on the individual at the personal level, the ability of such service providers to 
collect both primary and secondary data (as third-parties to other services) makes the applicability of 
these policies to individuals in the locational environment of equal worth. Because many of the 
agencies that partner with other agencies to provide enhanced mobile services for consumers may 
have access to data collected by partnering agencies, the privacy policies of these agencies are 
relevant to consumer privacy concerns. Here, as with general public agency policies described above, 
policies tend to be accessible online or per use, as opposed to being overtly stated primarily at time 
of initial application. Thus, the characteristics of policies of all agency types have been treated as 
broadly similar for purposes of the analysis.  
3.2 Methodology to Analyse Privacy Policies 
The analysis of privacy policies was designed to respond to the overarching question of, “To what 
extent and by what methods should privacy in ITS and LBS be protected”. Privacy policies were 
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chosen as the units of analysis here, as these are the primary methods by which agencies and 
organizations inform consumers as to how their personal data will be collected, stored, managed, 
shared and protected. Because there is no overarching privacy policy relevant to location data 
currently in place, the Federal Trade Commission’s Fair Information and Privacy Principles were used 
to develop baseline categories of interest, as described below. In this section, we provide an 
overview of the methodological approach to analyze privacy policies.  
We evaluate the privacy policies using several criteria. First, we determine the extent to which a 
privacy policy specifically addresses the data and location information aspect of the mobility service. 
Second, we address the extent to which the policy may be easily understood by a typical user by 
using a readability score. Third, we use content analysis as a way to systematically analyze the text in 
the privacy policies and to determine the extent to which the policies address privacy by using 
metrics connoted by the FTC FIPPs. For the content analysis, we make use of word frequencies to 
examine the extent to which the metrics are present in the policies and cluster analysis to identify 
which groupings of criteria may be more closely aligned with one another contextually.  
As described previously, we began by selecting a sample of privacy policies that became the set of 
items that were subject to a content analysis. Content analysis is used here to evaluate, first, 
differences in the treatment of privacy notifications to consumers by public and private agencies 
and, second, to identify gaps in the information presented to consumers on the treatment and use 
of their travel data. In general, content analysis enables an objective description of the manifest or 
written content of textual material (Berelson, 1974), by determining the presence of themes, 
phrases or other related attributes of the material (Nuendorf, 2002).  Once the set of texts to be 
analyzed were identified, we next broke them down into component units of analysis, in this case 
words and phrases, that were then coded into constructs of interest.  
Subjectivity has been noted to be of concern in content analysis and Kassarjian (1977) stated that 
reproducibility of results by different analysts analyzing the same content is a key requirement of 
objectivity. For purposes of this research, the issue of subjectivity has been addressed, in part, via 
the use of the automated content analysis software WordStat. It should be noted, however, that a 
text will always involve multiple meanings and that there is always some degree of interpretation 
required on the part of the researcher (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Quantitative content 
analysis bypasses this difficulty to some degree by holding to the rigors of statistical analysis 
requirements, but it is difficult to argue that any content analysis will be completely free from the 
biases of the researcher and text coder.  
For this analysis, the constructs of interest were developed and operationalized into metrics by 
reviewing the constructs and questions of interest in relation to the current treatment of privacy in 
regard to law and legal issues. These steps required identification of a broad underlying set of 
categories of interest in relation to privacy, for which the FTC’s categories identified above were 
chosen. Policies were collected, coded and tested for consistency before performing the detailed 
statistical analysis. Figure 1 provides an overall description of the steps undertaken.  
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Figure 1: Content Analysis Process Flowchart 
 
 
Both cluster and correspondence analysis are used for purposes of the content analysis. For the 
cluster analysis, the main objective is to split the set of privacy policies according to some textual 
feature variables, in this case constructs of interest from the FTC as described above. From this 
splitting, the similarity of entities is assessed based upon the comparisons of attributes they contain. 
For the computational step in determining similarity, many measures have been suggested including 
correlation coefficiants, distance measures, association coefficients and probabilistic similarity 
measures (a far from complete list referring to this voluminous literature includes Al Khalifa, et al, 
2009; Sneath and Sokal, 1973).  
We used Euclidean distance to determine similarity, where distance is calculated based on user-
defined “cases” (here defined as policies of interest), and then compared to other cases to 
determine similarity. This type of method may be generally called an agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering method, as it begins with many individual elements which are successively combined 
based on distance measures until only one cluster remains, containing all elements of interest. We 
have used dendrograms to visually display the results of the hierarchical clustering structure. 
Additional graphical analysis, using correspondence analysis, was utilized in order to observe 
interrelationships between terms identified from the privacy policies and privacy metrics derived 
from the FTC criteria, in 2- or 3-dimensional space. This visual tool allows us to identify and describe 
how well policies of interest respond to constructs and categories of privacy interest identified in the 
FTC policy, as well as to examine if there are patterns in how these constructs are treated by 
different types of agencies or organizations. 
 
 
Development of 
Research Question 
Locational Privacy Construct 
Identification 
Identification and collection of 
privacy policies of interest based on 
convenience sampling 
Policy coding of terms 
Cluster analysis Correspondence Frequency 
 
Coding consistency  
checking & correction 
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4. Description of Privacy Policies 
 
In terms of the specificity of the content of the policies, privacy policies evaluated here fall into two 
general categories: first are those that deal generally with privacy issues over a range of services 
offered by the organization (such as website, mobility services, and applications); second are those 
that specifically address the privacy issues inherent in use of a mobile service or application. The 
distinction here is an important one, as data gathered from each of these sources will provide 
varying degrees of personal information related to a traveler’s location, preferences, and patterns of 
use. In collecting privacy policies for this analysis, efforts were made to concentrate on specific 
polices related to the use of applications and services offered by providers; however, in many cases 
available policies were generic and related to general data collection policies and website use.  
 
While all of the policies of private providers referred to use of their websites, only a few referred 
specifically to how the privacy policy will be implemented with respect to products, services or 
location information. Roughly 49% addressed the specific product or service, while 42% addressed 
location-specific information. This finding was concerning, as it reflects that many companies do not 
recognize and/or acknowledge that privacy concerns specific to location information may exist. 
General privacy policies of public service providers are not linked to specific applications, and thus 
generally do not address location- or product-specific information. As noted above, those providers 
that do provide services that may be able to track location data (such as ETC or electronic transit 
cards) have had their policies evaluated separately. 
 
In terms of the ability of users to comprehend the policies, as noted in our earlier paper, the Office of 
Educational Research and Improvement (2002), estimates that the average reading level of U.S. 
adults is between the 8th and 9th grade. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level calculator, which uses 
average sentence length and average number of syllables per word along with weighting factors to 
determine a reading level, is a standard test used to ascertain the general readability of texts as 
measured by US grade level. The test was applied to each policy considered, resulting in the 
following averages: 
• Overall average (all companies): 14.60 (range of 9.71 – 24.50) 
• Overall average (public organizations): 14.33 (range of 11.43 – 19.02) 
• Overall average (private companies): 14.27 (range of 9.71 – 24.50) 
• Overall average (ETC providers): 13.87 (range of 10.09 – 17.69) 
• Overall average (Electronic Transit Card providers): 15.34 (range of 12.09 – 23.06) 
 
These figures indicate that the overall average reading grade of the privacy policies studied here is 
roughly that of a sophomore to a junior in college, well over that of the average US adult. Such a 
finding provides a baseline indication that the privacy policies used by mobile transportation service 
providers may not be understandable by the average user, and thus do not meet the FTC’s general 
notice provision. 
 
4.1 Categorization 
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Categorization allows for individual words or phrases to be grouped under a common heading, thus 
simplifying the process of analyzing text within headings of interest. As noted above, the metrics 
operationalizing the FTC’s five FIPPs categories were used for this purpose here. Words and phrases 
within the identified privacy principles were assigned to a category based upon their most common 
uses and meanings. To effectively categorize words, a number of policies were reviewed to 
determine how words and associated phrases were used within the context of the policies.  Words 
and phrases within policies were next assigned a category and then these categorizations were 
compared across policies to ensure consistency.  
 
Once words and phrases contained in the document were categorized and subjected to the 
consistency check, a frequency analysis was run at the category level to determine how often 
policies referred to the assigned topics. While some words tended to overlap in different categories, 
most were able to be effectively and accurately classified into overall categories. Table 2 outlines 
how frequently occurring words were categorized. Two separate analyses were performed: one on 
privacy policies of public companies and one of privacy policies of private companies. The next 
section reviews results of each of the two analyses. Here, we build upon results from Cottrill and 
Thakuriah (2011) but expand to provide more detailed analysis and to allow for a comparison 
between public and private organizations. This addition broadens both the scope and applicability of 
the project. 
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Table 2:  Privacy Policy Word Categorization 
Classification Privacy Concept 
Category
Keywords Classification Privacy Concept 
Category
Keywords
Contest Change Contest About Assurance
Incorrect Changes
View View Children's Privacy
Choice/Consent Opt-in Collected Data Address
Opt-Out Birthdate
Contact Contact Device
Questions Device ID
Government Enforcement Government IP Address
Legal Claims Location
Legal rights Password
Required by law Personal Information
Safe Harbor Phone number
TrustE Name
Private Remedies Disclosure Preferences
Fraud Username
Illegal Zip code
Investigate Cookie use Cookie
Prevent Cookies and Clickthrough Beacon
Take action Data Mining Combine
Transfer Mine
Violation Data Use Advertising
Terms of use Billing
Self Regulation Your responsibility Contests
You guard Outreach
Protect your Publicity
Managerial Managerial Support
Administrative User experience
Procedural Ownership Ownership
Technical Electronic Own 
Technical Third Parties Advertisers
Physical External links
Protect  Government agencies
Security Partners
Third parties
Vendors
User Action Check in
Download
Make a call
Report location
Send a text message
You send
You tell us
You click
Content Analysis Database Keyword Categorization
Enforcement/ 
Redress
Integrity/ 
Security
Access/ 
Participation
Notification/ 
Awareness
  
4.2 Frequency Analysis 
 
A general frequency analysis was conducted in order to describe the landscape of the presence of 
identified privacy elements in the privacy policies of both public and private providers, as well as 
policies associated with ETC and electronic transit card services, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, which 
demonstrate, first, the relative occurrence of keywords in specific categories compared to those of 
other categories, and, second, how often the criteria metrics were present in the policy category of 
interest. Clear differences and similarities in the topics addressed by policies in each category quickly 
emerge. Overall, it is evident that the “Collected Data” category is the most widely addressed, with 
elements cited by roughly 97% and 98% of public and private companies, respectively. Such a finding 
is unsurprising for a number of reasons: 1) the number of words included in this category (13) is 
higher than that of any other category, and 2) The overarching category (“Notification/Awareness”) 
is often considered the fundamental privacy principle, as it is notification of rights and 
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responsibilities that encourages the development of privacy policies. This finding is not accurate , 
however, for ETC and transit card providers, with only 14.4% of these policies addressing this issue. 
This finding may be related to these policies addressing only general confidentiality practices, and 
relying on agency privacy policies for more substantive information.  
 
Private companies were generally likely to address more aspects of privacy as identified in the FTC 
guidance, with some exceptions such as Children’s Privacy, language referring to notification of 
changes to the privacy policy, and actions related to third parties. Public agencies, on the other 
hand, fall short in their addressing of managerial means of privacy protection and the issue of how 
users may contest or change collected data. ETC and electronic transit card providers, in general, 
demonstrated overall inconsistency with policy framing when compared to both public and private 
policies. This may, again, be related to reliance on general privacy policies to address more specific 
areas of privacy (such as children’s privacy or data collection and use policies), but may also reflect a 
difference in how privacy terms for these policies differ significantly from those of more 
comprehensive service providers. 
Figure 2: Percentage Frequencies of Category Metrics within Coded Criteria  
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Figure 3: Percentage of Policies Referencing Specific Category Topics 
 
 
 
Frequency analysis, on its own, is insufficient to evaluate the overarching comprehensiveness of 
privacy policies, as it does not allow for the context of identified elements to be adequately 
described. For example, while it is of use to determine how many organizations or agencies refer to 
either “Self-regulation” or “Contact” under Enforcement/Redress, it may be of more value to 
ascertain how many policies refer to both concepts, and to what extent the two are related, in order 
to determine the degree of input the consumer has on protection of his or her privacy. In order to 
evaluate such measures, cluster analysis may provide additional insights. 
4.3 Cluster Analysis 
 
Figure 4 shows a dendrogram which visually depicts the results of the cluster analysis. In a 
dendrogram, the vertical axis is made up of the items and the horizontal axis represents the clusters 
formed at each step of the clustering procedure. Words or categories that tend to appear together 
are combined at an early stage while those that are independent from one another or those that do 
not appear together tend to be combined at the end of the agglomeration process (Provalis, 2010).    
 
For purposes of this analysis, we have chosen to use cosine theta, which, “…measures the cosine of 
the angle between two vectors of values. It ranges from -1 to +1” (Provalis Research, 2010). This 
method has been chosen as it takes into account not only the presence of a word or phrase in a 
case, but also how often the word or phrase occurs. This additional information will allow for better 
determinations of similarity to take place. Dendrograms using cosine theta for private and public 
privacy policies, as well as ETC and electronic transit card policies are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Policy analysis dendrograms identifying clusters of related concepts 
 
Private Policy Dendrogram 
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Public Policy Dendrogram 
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ETC and Electronic Transit Card Dendrogram 
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From the dendrograms above, we can determine weight, compactness, and distinctness, which are 
defined as follows: 
• Weight - the rough percentage of all individuals that fall within each cluster 
• Compactness - how similar to one another the elements of a cluster are 
• Distinctness - how different one cluster is from its closest neighbor (ESRI, 2002) 
 
From the dendrograms above, one can see that public and private privacy policies and 
ETC/Electronic Transit Card policies have quite different structures regarding the presence of various 
privacy metrics. For example, for private policies the codes for “Opt-in” and “Collected data” are 
quite compact, indicating that they are fairly similar in presence. The weight of the primary cluster 
which contains these elements is also fairly high, with 38% (eight of 21) of criteria elements falling 
within this cluster with a similarity index of 0.6. Such a finding indicates that the clustered elements 
(Opt-in, Collected data, Contact, Cookies and Click-through, User action, Ownership, Government 
enforcement and Technical) are relatively similar in their presence within the privacy policies of the 
included private agencies. While at first glance the cluster may seem odd, it is clear that each of the 
included elements are, a) seen with relatively high frequency according to Figure 3, and b) primarily 
related to Notification/Awareness. The clustering of these concepts indicates that they are closely 
related within the objectives of these privacy policies within the private sector.  
 
A second fairly compact cluster consists of the following six elements: Private remedies, Children’s 
privacy, Data use, Cookie use, Self-regulation and Integrity/security. While still primarily concerned 
with Notification/awareness, this cluster is more closely concerned with how consumer data are 
used and protected. The relatively higher inclusion of Enforcement/redress categories here indicates 
that those companies that include some information regarding the protection of consumer data are 
also likely to include information on the uses of those data. It is possible that the relative freedom of 
private companies as opposed to public companies to determine enforcement mechanisms may play 
a role in this clustering. 
 
For public provider privacy policies, the landscape is somewhat different. The closest cluster in this 
area is that of Assurance and Ownership, both included under Notification/awareness. The 
Assurance element is a somewhat general category, consisting primarily of statements related to 
general assurances of privacy for the consumer (such as, “Agency X values your privacy”, etc.). Such 
assurances are fairly generic, thus their close association with the element of Ownership, which 
occurs in a relatively small number of cases, is somewhat surprising. In all, based on the clusters 
identified, there is less overall consistency of content in public privacy policies than in their private 
company counterparts; however, as with private companies, one fairly large cluster does exist. The 
largest and most compact cluster is composed of the following elements: Government enforcement, 
Technical, Data use, Changes, Children’s privacy, Third parties, Assurance, Ownership, and Cookie 
use. As above, this cluster has a similarity index of 0.6, indicating fairly close association. As with the 
private company policies, Notification/awareness is the primary category associated with this 
cluster; however, the types of information provided to the consumer is somewhat different. One 
possible rationale for this is that such elements as the protection of children’s privacy are mandated 
under federal law, and are thus more likely to be included by government agencies. Also, more strict 
regulations regarding the sharing of data by public agencies may make more explicit information 
regarding this element more common. In general, however, it appears that like elements tend to be 
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clustered with like, indicating that there are some limitations as to the comprehensiveness of 
policies in addressing each of the above-identified primary categories.    
 
Clusters seen in ETC and electronic transit card policies are markedly different from those of both 
public and private service providers. Here, the closest cluster is that of “Managerial” and “Collected 
Data,” with a similarity index of roughly 0.9, indicating that these two concepts are closely related in 
these policies. Such a close relationship reflects, in part, the reliance upon the concept of “data 
confidentiality” in these agreements, with many policies indicating that collected data will be kept 
confidential via limitations on the ability to share data by managerial means. The relatively close 
association of “Private Remedies,” which generally indicates that the service provider will use 
internal methods to address confidentiality or privacy concerns, also indicates that such concerns 
are often viewed from the vantage point of agency responsibilities.  The remaining clusters are far 
less compact, indicating a high level of distinctness for each cluster. This is, in part, reflective of the 
findings from the frequency analysis, which indicated that there is little consistency in the degree of 
information provided to consumers in the framework of this analysis.   
4.4 Correspondence Analysis  
 
For purposes of this analysis, correspondence will be looked at generally via the use of 2- and 3-D 
correspondence plots to allow graphical analysis based on the sub-categories identified in Table 1 
above in the context of public, private, and ETC and electronic transit card policies. While individual 
keyword analysis can be performed, such analysis tends to create overly complex graphics, which are 
difficult to analyze. As this analysis is focused more generally on the presence of key concepts found 
within each type of policy, the decision has been made to focus on the overall clusters of interest 
found within each category. Additionally, case occurrences of sub-categories are analyzed in order to 
better identify how concepts correspond within policies. It is expected that there will be differences 
between the correspondence analyses of the policies analyzed, particularly in regard to enforcement 
and children’s privacy, due, in part, to expectations reflected in policies relevant to public service 
providers. The following section will outline the findings of the correspondence analysis. 
 
Graphical representations of correspondence allow for a more visual representation of the 
correspondences discussed above, and provide a clearer picture of how the privacy policies 
discussed here relate to one another and to the examined keyword categories. Two- and  three-
dimensional plots are created using cross-tabulations (or contingency tables) of rows and columns, 
where columns represent the category of policy studied, and rows represent the category of 
keyword (as seen in Table 1). The closeness of points in the chart represents similarity of row or 
column profiles. Lebart, et al. (1998) noted that, “According to usual notation, fi. designates the sum 
of the elements of row i and f.j is the sum of the elements of column j of this table. The profile of row 
i is the set of p values: 
, 1,...,ij
i
f
j p
f
 
= 
 
 
The profile of column j is the set of n values: 
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The origins of the axes in correspondence plots represent the marginals of the table of frequencies, 
with distance from the origin indicating singularity of items (in this case, privacy policy types). A 
visual representation of the contributing factors to this similarity or difference is found in the 
position of category keywords relative to the policies of interest. As with the policy categories, the 
location of a keyword category relative to the location of the origin or policy type indicates its’ 
singularity relative to the overall distribution. Category and sub-category associations for public, 
private, ETC, and electronic transit card providers are presented in Figure 5. Disaggregated 2-D 
figures are shown in addition to the full 3-D plot, as the degree of correspondence between certain 
themes may make it difficult to fully ascertain their similarities.  
 
It is evident from these figures that significant differences exist in the types of policies examined 
here. In particular, ETC policies vary greatly with respect to the origin of the remaining three policy 
types along all axes, indicating that they display the most dissimilarity and the least inclusion of 
categories of interest. Given the discussion above, this is not a surprising finding; however, the 
degree of difference seen in the plot above indicates the degree of difference between each of the 
policy types in relation to the keyword categories studied. Here, distance from the origin indicates 
the relative singularity of items of interest. Table 3 below provides an overview of relative distance 
from the origin for both categories and variables of interest.  
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Figure 5: Correspondence Plot of Policy Concepts with Policy Types 
 
2-D Correspondence Plot: Axis 1 vs. Axis 2 
 
 
2-D Correspondence Plot: Axis 1 vs. Axis 3 
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2-D Correspondence Plot: Axis 2 vs. Axis 3 
 
 
3D Correspondence Plot 
 
 
 
x 
y 
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Table 3: Relative Distance (or Item Uniqueness) from the Axis of Origin of Privacy Policy Types and 
Content Categories  
Item Axis1 (x) Axis 2 (y) Axis 3 (z)
private 0.479 1.071 -0.546
public -1.108 -0.528 -0.175
ETransit 0.763 -0.325 1.863
ETC 2.894 -3.409 -2.317
Item Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
Contest_Change -0.247 0.678 0.843
View 0.799 0.726 -0.431
Opt-In 1.533 -0.915 0.448
Opt-Out 0.954 0.087 -0.111
Contact 1.939 -1.906 -2.182
Government_Enforcement -0.815 -1.411 -0.156
Private_Remedies 0.666 1.267 0.08
Self-Regulation 0.375 -0.574 -1.255
Managerial -0.223 1.183 -0.28
Technical -0.725 -0.233 1.836
About -0.224 0.824 0.558
Assurance 0.158 0.348 0.683
Changes 1.317 -1.28 -1.49
Children's_Privacy -1.692 0.008 -1.032
Collected_Data 0.145 -0.708 1.819
Cookie_Use -0.992 0.578 -0.699
CookiesAndClickThrough -2.225 -0.685 -0.682
Data_Mining 3.11 -2.006 3.436
Data_Uses -0.058 1.183 -0.13
Ownership -2.178 -1.145 0.508
Third_Parties 0.551 1.353 -0.6
User_Action -0.053 0.216 0.169
Variable Coordinates
Category Coordinates
 
 
Again, it is clear that the ETC category of privacy policies is the most singular of the policy types 
studied. In addition, contact, changes, opt-in and data mining are the most singular of categories. 
The charts and findings above indicate that while there is some consistency in topics addressed in 
overall privacy policies, there are some significant discrepancies in how well these topics are 
addressed by the various types of organization of interest. Such a finding, and the issues associated 
with these inconsistencies, indicates that there is scope for guiding policy that would bring more 
clarity and consistency to privacy policies. Particularly in the area of contact information and access 
to information, current practices leave the consumer with little information or ability to ensure that 
collected data are accurate and being used correctly.  
 
The question of the singularity of ETC policies likely rests on a combination of factors. First, publicly 
available ETC privacy policies tend to be quite limited in scope. As noted above, these policies or 
language tend to consist of a short section within the context of a larger document, and tend to 
refer more broadly to overarching policies applicable to the state. One potential explanation for this 
is that because more traditionally “sensitive” data (in particular, financial data) are collected for ETC 
activities, ETC provision agencies are more cautious about promising protection of user data and 
thus prefer to keep language fairly vague. Another potential explanation is that ETC providers feel 
that the scope of their privacy protection is well addressed by other organizations (again, in 
particular financial) and that, as they must meet those privacy protections, there is no need to be 
additionally constrained. It is likely that each of these potential explanations plays some role in the 
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finding of the singularity of ETC privacy policies; however, additional examination of these agencies 
would be useful for greater understanding.  
 
It is also evident from the plot and values shown that the overall structure of the “private” policies is 
most reflective of the general makeup of the policies as a whole. The clustering of keywords 
reflected by the value similarities of private policies along the axis supports the earlier finding that 
private policies tend to be most likely to contain reference to a broad segment of concepts identified 
through the FTC FIPPs. The public and ETransit categories, on the other hand, are closely related to 
specific concepts, but do not address as holistically the universe of privacy topics.   
 
5. Findings 
 
A number of findings may be drawn from the preceding analysis, particularly in relation to 
consistency and comprehensiveness. One key finding is that it is often difficult to obtain application 
or service-specific information on privacy policies related to data collected in the mobile 
environment. The lack of policies dealing specifically with location information gathered as part of 
application use or electronic transportation services (such as position information, trip routes 
traveled, or origin and destination information) indicates that there is currently little attention being 
given to location based privacy. While consumers are generally assured that any personal 
information they provide (such as name, address, or financial information) will be protected by the 
collecting agency, non-personal data (such as IP address or patterns of use) are often considered 
anonymous, and thus consumers are informed that they may be shared with other agencies, or 
released in aggregated forms. While this type of protection may be sufficient for static data, it 
becomes more problematic if location data such as origins, destinations, or travel paths are not 
specifically defined as personal or anonymous. If data collected via the use of ITS or LBS technologies 
are treated as anonymous data, they may be subject to lesser degrees of privacy protection, thus 
opening up the potential for misuse or loss of anonymity. The overall lack of policies specific to the 
treatment of these data is worrying, as it is likely that without specific guidelines directing 
appropriate uses, the minimal amount of protection will be afforded. Thus, a key finding of this 
study is that current policies are lacking in their treatment of location specific data. 
 
The analysis here supports the earlier finding that there is very little consistency across privacy 
policies in how well they address privacy concerns as outlined by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), and reveals that this is applicable to public as well as private organizations. In particular, 
policies were lacking in providing information related to how consumers may view or correct data 
that have been collected; what data may be shared with third parties; what procedures consumers 
should follow if they feel that their data have been mishandled; and issues associated with data 
ownership and data mining. Again, these findings indicate that there is an overall lack of 
comprehensiveness associated with locational privacy policies, particularly in regard to consumer 
expectations of protection. While consumer expectations are not addressed in detail here, it is 
reasonable to believe that consumers expect basic protections of personal data. While consumers 
may not demonstrate explicit awareness, privacy of personal data is a general expectation as shown 
by court findings related to the Fourth Amendment. If existing privacy policies do not demonstrate a 
comprehensive reflection of the expectations of the federal government and, in turn, consumers, it 
may be posited that a general framework for construction of privacy policies relevant to location 
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information should be developed, in order that consumers may develop accurate expectations 
regarding treatment of their data. 
 
A third key finding is related to the differences in the content of the types of policies evaluated here; 
namely, private, public, ETC, and Electronic Transit Card. A lack of consistency across the different 
types of policies indicates that agencies and companies tend to value different types of information 
provided to consumers. For example, public agencies consistently address the issue of children’s 
privacy in their policies, as mandated by federal regulation. Without this requirement, however, 
private agencies are far less likely to address this issue. The cluster analysis conducted revealed 
significant differences in how well issues of interest are addressed across policy types, with those 
policies related to the use of Electronic Toll Collection systems showing the lowest degree of 
attention paid to overall privacy issues. Discrepancies across the range of policies analyzed indicate 
that consumers have very little consistent protection or information on which to base their 
expectations of privacy in the mobile network, thus it may be inferred that service agencies are not 
successfully meeting their responsibilities in regard to ensuring adequate protection of privacy.  
 
6. Conclusions 
As shown above, there are large discrepancies in how agencies, organizations and companies 
involved with the collection of travel data treat those data. Significant findings from the content 
analysis of privacy policies include recognition that considerable differences exist in how privacy is 
treated in public and private contexts, which may lead to difficulties in leveraging the use of one for 
benefits for both. If public agencies, for example, are to access and use data collected by private 
agencies, or vice-versa, significant problems may be encountered related to the potential for mining 
consumer information and revealing potentially sensitive information. With a lack of consistent 
guidance related to all aspects of data privacy in the mobile environment, including 
notification/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, and 
enforcement/redress, it is difficult for providers of ITS and LBS services to effectively plan and 
prepare for effective data protection.  
 
The lack of consistency evident in the policy analysis carries with it implications for future 
implementation of ITS and LBS systems, as well as ubiquitous networked mobility systems. If policy-
makers and the general public are not confident that collected data will be treated in a manner in 
keeping with privacy expectations of the general public, it is likely that funding and implementation 
of such systems will be stymied until such time as adequate protections are in place. By 
acknowledging the failures of the current approach, it may be possible to identify needed 
protections and begin the process of developing both technological protections that may be built 
into future systems, as well as developing policy guidance to ensure that these protections are 
adhered to. Addressing needs associated with differing operational models in the public and private 
environments will also be necessary if public-private partnerships are to be developed. Such 
inconsistencies are also detrimental to the ability of consumers to determine accurate expectations 
of privacy in the mobile environment, or effective ways of mitigating privacy risks.  
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The emergence of low-cost GPS technologies and mobile applications on smartphones has brought 
the public environment into the private sphere, which creates uncertainty in relation to chains of 
data creation, awareness, ownership and sharing, topics not effectively or clearly covered by the 
policies studied here. The lack of information regarding ownership, in particular, is a difficult matter 
to address, as most privacy policies evaluated either do not refer to who owns the data, or explicitly 
state that collected data are owned by the collecting entity. While most policies do indicate that 
collected data may be shared by the collecting entity for purposes of law enforcement, the degree of 
information collected may not be adequately presented to the consumer. In such cases, the 
expectations of the service user may be at odds with the practices of the collecting entity. Here, 
additional clarity with respect to collected data and potential uses would be of use to the consumer 
and the courts, as it would allow for more reasonable expectations to be developed. These 
expectations could be managed in the following ways: 
1. Inform consumers of specific types of data that may be collected: While many privacy 
policies inform consumers that their name, email address, and various travel data may be 
collected, many others make only vague references to types of data that may be obtained 
via use of the service or application. Provision of more specific data regarding what data (in 
particular, location data) may be collected may provide consumers with the ability to 
develop more informed expectations regarding types of data that may be collected. 
2. Inform consumers of potential for data uses: As shown above, consumers are currently not 
provided adequate information regarding how their data may be used by collecting 
agencies. Additional information regarding the potential for use by third parties, in legal 
contexts, and for transportation benefits (such as safety increases and efficiency 
improvement) may give consumers scope for making more informed decisions regarding the 
sharing of data. Publishing agreements between collecting entities and those with whom 
they share data would also be useful in this context, as this would provide consumers with 
better information with which to make decisions relevant to sharing of data and expectation 
of privacy risks.  
3. Provide consumers with clear information regarding data ownership: Indicate to consumers 
what data will be generated via use of the service or application, and indicate specifically the 
agency that will be considered to be the “owner” of said data. Provide specific information 
regarding the extent of this ownership, including allowed uses and management in the case 
of account termination. 
4. Provide companies with clear direction regarding federal expectations towards data 
collection and use: Here, it may be helpful to develop an overarching policy that explicitly 
addresses expectations of collection, storage, management and use of data obtained 
through consumer use of mobile applications and services.  
 
The methods proposed here would, it is hoped, address some of the issues identified in the 
preceding analysis, and provide clearer guidance to those entities involved with the collection of 
data in the mobile environment. While point 4 above refers more specifically to the US federal 
expectations, it should be noted that each of the above recommendations may be implemented 
under any geographic scope. It should be noted that doing so would provide immense benefits to 
both consumers and agencies worldwide, by implementing more standard practices into the realm 
of location data.  
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